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ABSTRACT: 
This paper explores how a transition from a progressive to a flat tax scheme would affect 
economic growth in the OECD countries on the period from 1997 to 2007. A meta-regression 
analysis on eighteen calibration studies on flat tax reforms provides robust results of the 
mean tax elasticity as well as estimates for long run growth. Based on the 2006/2007 level of 
tax progressivity and tax elasticity, the average growth potential is found to be around 6.75 
percent, translating into a growth potential of 9.16 percent in real output for the OECD area. 
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For what reason ought equality to be the rule in matters of taxation? For the reason, that it 
ought to be so in all affairs of government.  
John Stuart Mill in Principles of Political Economy, Book V, Chapter II (1900) 
How and from whom tax is raised matters, not just how much. One can easily imagine that a 
broad-based but low rate tax system is effective in resource terms. And a simple, fair and 
transparent system that operates with broad social consensus is important for good 
governance and compliance. 
Angel Gurría, OECD Secretary-General at the International Conference on Financing for 
Development, Doha, 29 November 2008 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the OECD countries complicated tax schemes are the rule rather than the exception. The 
governments have over time amended the tax system for redistributive and other political 
purposes. Unfortunately, these tax schemes create significant efficiency gaps in the 
economies (see e.g. Arnold, 2008)3. Even for professionals, most of today’s tax schemes in 
the OECD area are not easy to understand. Tax evasion, tax avoidance and tax planning are 
widespread for individuals, private firms and even among state-owned companies. The 
negative impact of complicated tax schemes is enlarged by large shadow economies 
(Schneider, 2005) and reduced incentives. On the other hand, some economists argue that 
flat tax schemes may provide the tax payers with benefits such as lower tax burden, reduced 
compliance costs, increased incentives, and, not least, fair treatment, whereas the benefits 
for the governments may be reduced compliance control costs and possibly increased tax 
income (see Hall and Rabushka, 1995 and Rabushka, 2009). Not surprisingly, in the last years 
an increasing number of countries have been implementing flat tax schemes4.  
                                                          
3
 A discussion of the impact of taxes in economic efficiency can be found in Adams (2001), where he also 
explains the world history from a taxation perspective. 
4
 The Flat Tax Club consists of countries and jurisdictions such as Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Guernsey, Hong Kong, Iceland, Illinois (US), Indiana 
(US), Iraq, Jamaica, Jersey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Massachusetts (US), 
Mauritius, Michigan (US), Mongolia, Montenegro, Pennsylvania (US), Pridnestrovie, Romania, Russia, Serbia 
and Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Trinidad, Ukraine, and Uri (Switzerland). See Edwards and Mitchell (2008) 
and Rabushka (2009). 
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The exercise that we propose to perform in this paper is particularly relevant in the current 
context of international financial and real economy crisis. To overcome the global recession 
and retain international competitiveness, countries need to evaluate the effectiveness of 
alternative fiscal policies5. 
The focus of this paper is then the relation between taxation, in terms of alternative tax 
schemes, and economic growth. We study the long run economic effects of an introduction 
of flat tax schemes in the OECD countries. Previous studies have indicated that flat tax 
schemes might boost growth. However, given the different methodologies used and the 
diverse estimates obtained for economic growth potential, it is hard to evaluate what the 
real impacts of flat tax reforms may be. In this study, we intend to give a unifying figure for 
the effects of flat tax schemes6.  
In order to accomplish our objectives, we perform a meta-regression analysis on the effects 
of a flat-tax scheme on economic growth. The meta-regression analysis considers eighteen 
calibration studies on flat tax reforms. We use the mean tax elasticity from these studies, to 
obtain estimates for the long run growth in the OECD area. 
Some of the studies used in the meta-regression analysis present more than one measure of 
tax elasticity. We therefore had to select which measure to employ in the meta-regression 
analysis. Stanley and Jarrell (1998) provide a useful discussion on this matter. Multiple 
measures from one study are used only when representing different model frameworks. 
Occasionally it is clearly stated by the author(s) of the study the preferred measure and 
therefore, in these cases, we also adopt it. When this does not occur, we have calculated the 
average elasticity. Table 1 show the empirical studies included in the meta-regression 
analysis.  
                                                          
5
 In addition to the crisis we also have to think about globalization as the removal of the government 
monopolies. As labor and capital become increasingly mobile across country borders, governments have to 
face competition from other countries in terms of framework conditions (Vietor, 2007), such as climate, 
infrastructure, social security, employment, liberty, and taxation. Edwards and de Rugy (2002) apply the public 
choice theory put forward by Charles Tiebout, reasoning that competition between countries increases 
government efficiency. Tax competition is not solely a “tax haven” issue; it is also present between OECD 
countries (see Devereux et al., 2002, and Gotaas, 2007). 
6 
See for example Jensen (2008) for a review of current scenarios and trends within taxation, the role of 
government, and the case for flat tax reforms as an opportunity for increased growth and prosperity. 
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Table 1: Calibration Studies Included in the Meta-Regression Analysis 
 
Elasticity estimates authors’ own calculations. 
The tax elasticity is compared in a meta-regression analysis to infer whether the model 
specification biases the results. We find that the calibration model specification and 
parameterization may have significant effects on the growth outcome. In particular, growth 
effects range from 0 to 17.88 percent.  The average growth potential in the studies is 6.75 
percent. Based on the relation between taxation and economic growth determined in the 
regression model, we then estimate the effects of implementing a flat tax scheme in the 
OECD countries. The 2006/2007 level of tax progressivity and elasticity is estimated to yield a 
growth potential of 9.16 percent in real output for the OECD area. These results remain 
robust after controlling for estimation bias in the parameter coefficients. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework for the 
empirical exercise. Section 3 reviews the literature on taxation and growth. In section 4 the 
meta-regression analysis is performed. In section 5, we simulate the effects of flat tax reform 
in the OECD area to a flat tax scenario as opposed to the current progressive tax schemes. 
Section 6 concludes and suggests further research. 
2. THEORETICAL and EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
The background of this paper is on flat tax schemes in the context of economic growth 
models. In terms of the empirical framework, the starting point is the econometric technique 
known as meta-analysis and the definition of tax elasticity. First, we describe the properties 
of flat tax schemes in terms of the notions of tax wedge and deadweight loss. Then, we 
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make a very short summary of the growth models that are at the base of the calibration 
studies that we use in our empirical investigation to estimate the effects of tax reforms. 
After that, we present the meta-regression analysis. We close this section by defining tax 
elasticity in the context of our empirical analysis. 
Flat Tax Schemes 
Flat tax schemes levy one single tax rate on all income for all tax payers regardless of income 
level. No deductions are granted, and all loopholes are eliminated. Most value added tax and 
social security schemes are proportional. In turn, progressive tax schemes levy low tax rates 
on small incomes and high tax rates on large incomes. Hence the share of tax burden is 
increasing. In addition numerous deductions are often implemented for distributive or policy 
reasons. Most OECD countries still use this type of tax scheme. However, some OECD 
countries and several non-OECD countries have switched from highly progressive tax 
schemes to flat tax schemes, often accompanied by a reduction in tax levels.  
The flat tax scheme does not necessarily need to be strictly proportional, since some 
progressivity exists when basic deductions are granted to limit the tax burden of the lower 
income groups. All other deductions and loopholes are however eliminated. Flat tax 
schemes may hence have less negative impact on the economy than more progressive tax 
schemes due to: (1) increased incentives – productivity growth increases profits 
proportionally rather than under-proportionally, 2) resources being spent on more 
productive activities than tax planning, and 3) direct and indirect efficiency effects, e.g. 
perceived beneficial framework conditions, reduced cost of compliance (for tax payers) and 
control (for government), increased entrepreneurship, attract foreign direct investment, and 
so forth (see for instances Cullena and Gordon, 2007)7. For these reasons Hall and Rabushka 
(1995) propose a full-scale reform of the US federal income tax.  
Figure 1 illustrates our points above on the differences between progressive, proportional 
and flat tax schemes (see also Davies and Hoy, 2002 and Moyes and Shorrocks, 1998). 
 
                                                          
7
 From an equality and fairness perspective only flat tax schemes provide both horizontal and vertical equity, 
i.e. tax payers at similar income levels face similar tax rates (horizontal equity) and simultaneously tax payers at 
lower income levels face lower tax rates than those at higher levels (vertical equity). 
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Figure 1: Tax Schemes 
 
Tax Wedge and Deadweight Loss  
The efficiency loss of taxes is best illustrated through the notions of tax wedge and 
deadweight loss. Tax wedge is the difference between labor costs and net wage (i.e. 
government revenue), either the tax is paid by the employer (payroll tax) or the employee 
(wage tax)8. The OECD defines tax wedge as the “sum of personal income tax and employee 
plus employer social security contributions together with any payroll tax less cash transfers”. 
The tax wedge implies a pure loss to society; the lost value to employer and employee not 
captured by government revenue. This is the basic version of the deadweight loss, e.g. 
Feldstein (1999) further includes tax avoidance and taxable income elasticity. Mankiw (1998) 
provides an entire chapter devoted to the costs of taxation. 
The notion of a deadweight loss implies that government revenue is spent as efficiently as it 
would be by employers and employees. Additional efficiency costs arise when this is not the 
case; however this is not captured by the deadweight loss formula. Ding (2008) however 
finds that a one percentage increase in the tax wedge can lead to about 0.09 percentage 
decrease in labor productivity growth rate for the OECD countries. 
                                                          
8
 Who pays the tax is actually irrelevant, as the tax burden depends on the elasticity of supply and demand 
(Mankiw, 1998, and Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2005). 
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The deadweight loss implied by the tax wedge implicitly implies that there are efficiency 
gains from reducing tax level and progressivity. This is confirmed in Feldstein (1999), and 
Hansen and Verdelin (2007), both of which also find effects of increased deadweight loss 
from increasing tax progressivity. Extending the deadweight loss formula to also include 
disincentives may yield increasing effects on deadweight loss, but Hansen and Verdelin 
(2007) find the effects to vary with the level of income. Tax planning, evasion and avoidance 
are, however, significant issues in this respect. 
Growth Models 
The relationship between taxation and economic growth has been studied through the 
employment of different growth models, such as Solow, Ramsey, overlapping generations, 
and endogenous growth models. For a review of these growth models, see Farmer (1999), 
Romer (2001), Gärtner (2006) and McCandless (2008). Note that some of the calibration 
studies that we use in the meta-regression analysis deploy the previously mentioned growth 
models directly; others apply modified (adjusted or augmented) versions. 
The neoclassical Solow model is the starting point of all growth analysis. In spite of suffering 
from important limitations (for example, it assumes constant returns to scale and a closed 
economy with no government) extensions of the Solow growth model may however increase 
its explanatory value. The Ramsey model extends the Solow model by considering an infinite 
horizon and endogenizing the saving rate. In particular, households make optimal 
intertemporal decisions on saving and consumption. Augmentation of the Ramsey model 
may further include Cobb-Douglas production function, leisure, variable labor, and tax. In 
turn, the basic overlapping generations (OLG) model is a dynamic lifecycle model which 
captures heterogeneity among agents. It is similar to the Ramsey model but with finitely-
lived individuals in different generations who trade in markets. The AK model, in turn, is the 
simplest form of an endogenous growth model. It is an extension of the Solow model which 
allows output to grow in proportion to capital. 
A limitation of the basic versions of all four models mentioned above is exogenous growth in 
capital and labor. Their advantage is that saving is endogenous and may be variable. The 
implicit effect of treating growth exogenously is that growth is temporary and will converge 
over time. This is not the case if we consider technological development, economies of scale 
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and scope, and population growth. Hence, to capture the fundamentals behind growth, 
endogenous growth models must be employed. 
As mentioned, augmenting the basic versions, or extending into general equilibrium (GE) or 
real business cycle (RBC) models, may yield empirical frameworks with endogenous growth. 
These models differ from the ones described above in that long run growth is not 
converging. More important for our case is that fiscal policies will affect growth, and 
therefore changes in the savings rate can have direct and indirect effects on growth9. In this 
sense, dynamic models are usually more adequate to determine the effects of tax reforms. 
Meta-Regression Analysis 
Multiple regression analysis predicts the value of a dependent variable based on other 
independent variables. Meta regression analysis can provide information on both whether 
there is a relationship between the variables and the form of these relationships. Using 
control variables for properties like methodology, variable definition and sample 
characteristics, it is possible to infer around the obtained results for different studies. 
Most studies that use the meta-regression analysis have as input econometric studies. 
However, there are too few econometric studies on the effects of tax reforms on economic 
growth to make a robust meta-regression analysis. There are however several calibration 
studies on the topic of tax reform. Since calibration exercises are more vulnerable than 
econometric studies for specification bias, the meta-regression analysis seems to be a good 
way to try to evaluate the robustness of the results obtained via calibration. 
The ordinary least square regression model is used to compare control variables (indicator 
variables) for model structure and parameter variables for model parameterizations. The 
methodology for meta-analysis is based on Stanley (2001). See also Card and Krueger (1995), 
Phillips and Goss (1995), Stanley (1998), Stanley and Jarrell (1998), Görg and Strobl (2001), 
and Jarrell and Stanley (2004). The meta-regression model is of the form: 
               
 
   
                         
(3) 
                                                          
9
 For an opposing view see Mendoza et al. (1997). 
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where    is the average tax elasticity in study  , and     represents the meta-independent 
variables characterizing the calibration studies in the sample in order to explain the variation 
in the   s across the studies.    is the coefficient of the  th control variable (see list in table 
2), and    is the error term. In the next section, we discuss the studies used in the meta-
regression analysis (see list in table 1). 
Tax Elasticity 
Given that the different calibration studies used in the meta-regression exercise employ 
different measures of output, we calculate the tax elasticity associated with each study. We 
follow, in particular, the methodology by Philips and Goss (1995). Tax elasticity is the 
percentage change in real output caused by a one percent change in tax progressivity. 
Average tax elasticity is then: 
   
 
 
  
  
   
 
 
 
   
 
(1) 
where    is efficiency gain, m is the number of elasticity estimates. In turn, tax progressivity 
is defined as the ratio: 
  
    
    
 
(2) 
where    is the lowest effective marginal tax rate and    is the highest
10. Using the tax 
progressivity ratio allows for inferring whether changes in output are due to changes in tax 
level or tax progressivity. 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section we review the calibration studies used in the meta-regression analysis. As 
discussed by Jensen (2008), Heath (2006) and Clemens et al. (2001), the literature on the 
effects of tax reform on economic growth is quite extensive. However, a number of studies 
on flat tax were left out of the meta-regression analysis due to their methodology. In 
                                                          
10
 Tax progressivity ratio is a modified version of the ratio in Caucutt et al. (2000). Vedder (1985) uses the 
definition      . Other studies use the Lorentz curve as basis for tax progressivity indices (Suits, 1977, and 
Stroup, 2005). 
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addition, as we have mentioned previously, we limit our meta-regression analysis to 
calibration studies given the few econometric studies available11. 
Altig and Carlstrom (1991) study the interaction between inflation, taxation and 
macroeconomic performance in an overlapping-generations model. They find that the 
distortionary effects from inflation and tax structure interactions are reduced by 0.2 to 1.1 
percentage points if a flat marginal tax rate scheme is introduced in place of the 1965 
progressive tax structure. 
Pecorino (1994), based on Lucas’ (1990) framework with an extended human capital 
production function, studies the growth effects of a tax reform in the US. He finds that 
removing tax on physical capital earnings (from  a 36 percent rate) would increase the wage 
tax rate from 40 to 45 percent and reduce the annual per capita output growth rate by 0.13 
percentage points. On the other hand, replacing the progressive 1985 income tax structure 
with a consumption tax would increase the per capita output growth rate by 1.06 
percentage points annually. In this case the distortionary effects of taxation on both growth 
rate and labor-leisure decisions are reduced. 
Jensen et al. (1994) study a tax reform where marginal tax rates are reduced and the tax 
base is broadened in a unionized labor market. They find that when wage formation is 
governed by union behavior and unions maximize the after-tax income of their members, 
the tax reform will be contractionary and welfare-reducing, yielding a long run loss of -4.1 
percent in output and -1.3 percent in aggregate welfare. On the other hand, when unions 
take into account the disutility of work of union members, long run output can increase by 
5.4 percent and aggregate welfare by 4.5 percent. 
Stokey and Rebelo (1995) study the implications of preferences, technology and tax policies 
on potential effects of tax reform on the long run growth rate of the US economy. They find 
that eliminating all taxes (which equals reducing tax progressivity to 1) would yield 0 - 0.33 
percentage point increases in growth rate. 
                                                          
11
 On econometric studies see Vedder (1985), Koester and Kormendi (1987), Colombino and del Boca (1990), 
Padovano and Galli (2001) and Lee and Gordon (2005). 
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Ventura (1996) studies the implications of replacing the US income and capital income tax 
structure with the Hall-Rabushka flat tax. He finds that a revenue-neutral reform will have a 
flat marginal tax rate ranging from 18.5 to 30.7 percent depending on deduction levels and 
agents’ relative risk aversion. Furthermore, eliminating double taxation on capital income 
has a significant impact on capital accumulation, resulting in output increases ranging from 
12.98 to 17.88 percent. He also finds that aggregate welfare gains from introducing a flat tax 
range from 2.5 to 4.5 percent. 
Jorgensen and Wilcoxen (1997a,b) study the impact of tax reforms on US economic growth. 
Two tax reforms are considered: a flat rate consumption tax similar to Hall-Rabushka’s flat 
tax, and a flat rate income-based value-added tax. They find that a revenue neutral flat 
consumption tax of 21.7 percent yields a 3.3 percent increase in long run output, whereas 
the income-based tax with a rate of 20.5 percent yields 1.4 percent higher long run output. 
They also suggest that reductions in compliance costs (USD 100-500 billion annually) would 
yield even higher gains, however this is not captured by the model. 
Rogers (1997) studies the effects of six different US tax reforms; flat marginal tax rate 
income, consumption, and wage taxes, with and without exemption levels. She finds that the 
more neutral tax system will have substantial efficiency effects. In particular, more neutral 
tax systems can increase long run output by 1.72 – 6.03 percent, depending on the 
responsiveness in the labor-supply decisions. 
Auerbach et al. (1997) study the macroeconomic effects of two tax reforms. They find that 
moving from the current US progressive income tax system to a flat income tax rate (at 25 
percent, with fixed deductions at USD 10 000 and USD 5 000 for each dependent) will reduce 
long run output by 3 percent. All other aggregate variables are also reduced; hence this 
reform is not feasible. On the other hand, moving to a flat tax rate of 22.4 percent on 
consumption with capital income exemptions will increase output by 7.5 percent. 
Caucutt et al. (2000) study tax progressivity and economic growth. They find that reducing 
tax progressivity increases growth. The effects of introducing flat rate taxes are significant, 
and aggregate welfare is unambiguously higher. Growth effects of eliminating tax 
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progressivity amount to 0.13 – 0.53 percentage points on growth rate, while welfare effects 
amount to 0.38 – 1.31 percent. 
Altig et al. (2001) study the welfare and macroeconomic effects of transitions to five 
fundamental alternatives to the US federal income tax. They find significant long-run gains in 
output and aggregate welfare in all cases (yet some groups lose). The estimated long run 
increase in output ranges from 1.9 percent in the case of a flat tax with transition relief, to 
9.4 percent in the case of a proportional consumption tax. 
Cassou and Lansing (2003) study the growth effects of shifting from the US progressive tax 
system to a flat tax similar to the Hall-Rabushka version. They find that the growth gain by a 
flat marginal tax rate at 34.37 percent and a pre-reform deduction level is between 0.009 
and 0.143 percentage points per capita depending on labor supply elasticity. Furthermore, if 
the pre-reform tax progressivity increases, the growth gains from introducing a flat tax will 
become even larger. 
Li and Sarte (2004) study progressive taxation and long run growth using progressive taxes 
(as opposed to approximated flat rate taxes) for the US. They show that the decrease in tax 
progressivity from the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA-86) increased the growth rate of output 
per capita by 0.12 – 0.34 percentage points. 
Conesa and Krueger (2006) study the optimal progressivity of the income tax code in the US 
with regards to the highest expected utility of individuals (maximum social welfare). They 
find that the optimal tax code will increase welfare by 1.7 percent and is equivalent to a flat 
marginal tax rate of 17.2 percent and a fixed deduction of USD 9 400, yielding a shift in GDP 
per capita of 0.64 percent. They also show that in the case of a pure proportional tax the 
shift would amount to 8.86 per cent. 
Carroll et al. (2006) study macroeconomic responses to three tax reforms presented by the 
President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform. The panel recommended two reforms 
which are hybrids of an income and consumption based tax. These are found to yield 
increases in output from 0.2 to 4.8 percent. The last reform, a progressive consumption tax, 
was not recommended by the panel, however the growth effects of this were even higher, 
ranging from 1.9 to 6 percent. This is consistent with other research proposing that taxing 
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consumption rather than income has less distortionary effects on the economy. They also 
conclude that there are additional gains of tax reforms not included in the models which are 
likely to yield even larger growth effects. 
González-Torrabadella and Pijoan-Mas (2006) study a series of flat tax reforms for Spain. 
They find that output increases for reforms with flat marginal tax rates up to 28.19 percent 
and fixed deductions up to 0.40 percent of benchmark average income. Gains in output 
range from 12.6 percent in the strictly proportional case to 0.6 percent in the most 
progressive case. Increasing tax progressivity will yield losses in all aggregate variables and is 
hence not feasible. Regarding welfare of the flat tax reforms they find that a marginal tax 
rate of 23.11 percent combined with a fixed deduction of 30 percent of per capita income 
will reduce the tax payable for the 60 percent with lowest incomes, and still yield a 5.1 
percent increase in output. 
Díaz-Giménez and Pijoan-Mas (2006) study the consequences of two revenue-neutral flat tax 
reforms in the US. In the lower progressivity case (flat marginal tax rate of 22 percent and 
fixed deductions of USD 16 000), output increases by 2.4 percent and productivity by 3.2 
percent. There is, however, a welfare loss of -0.17 percent. On the other hand, in the higher 
progressivity case (flat marginal tax rate of 29 percent and fixed deduction of USD 32 000), 
output decreases by -2.6 percent and productivity by -1.4 percent. In this case there is a 
welfare gain of 0.45 percent. The contractionary results, however, make this reform less 
feasible. Finally they conclude that flat taxes are better for the poorer than progressive tax 
regimes. 
The Office of Tax Analysis, US Department of the Treasury (2006) studies the economic 
effects of extending marginal tax reductions enacted in 2001 and 2003, which are set to 
expire ultimo 2010. They find that a continuation will have a significant effect on US long run 
economic growth. However, how the tax reduction is financed is of great importance – using 
future tax increases instead of reduced government spending may yield lower increase in 
output, 0.3 percent compared to 1.1 percent, and is strongly discouraged. 
Elger and Lindqvist (2007) study the effects of a flat tax reform in Sweden. They find that a 
strictly proportional tax scheme with a marginal tax rate of 31.95 percent increases long run 
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output by 7.65 percent. Increasing the marginal rate and introducing deductions up to 20 
percent of benchmark income level will still yield gain in output by 0.69 percent, whereas a 
flat tax rate of 42.89 percent with 30 percent deduction on labor income reduces output by 
3.99 percent. The latter case yields losses in all aggregate variables and is hence not feasible. 
Aggregate welfare increases in all cases except for the most progressive scheme.  
As we can see, the effects of tax reforms on economic growth are quite diverse. It is 
therefore important to be able to provide a unifying figure that can serve as a guide to 
governments. We propose to do this in the next sections. 
4. META-REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Sample Description and Modification 
As noted by Görg and Strobl (2001) the selection of variables in a meta-regression analysis is 
usually arbitrary, since there is no theory to guide us on the choice. We opt by following 
Phillips and Goss’ (1995) suggestion of choosing a set of moderator variables that are 
commonly used in calibration studies (see table 2). These moderator variables are dummies 
describing the characteristics of each study regarding measure, data source, and model 
structure. We further include the study parameters which Stokey and Rebelo (1995) find to 
be significantly correlated with output estimations. Labor supply elasticity is not included, 
however, as all but one study (González-Torrabadella and Pijoan-Mas, 2006) treat this 
parameter endogenously. Tax treatment of human capital is assumed to be well covered by 
the dependent variable. 
A preliminary regression (1) (see table 3) shows that the moderator variables constitute a 
poor model fit, in that adjusted R-squared is 0, and the variance inflation factors range from 
3.3 to 23.5. The multicollinearity problem is confirmed. A Pearson correlation test shows 
that the number of variables that are significantly correlated is relatively high. There are 34 
instances where moderator variables are significantly correlated; of which 8 at the 1 percent 
level, 14 at the 5 percent level, and 12 at the 10 percent level. Only one parameter variable 
is not significantly correlated with the other variables. This test also shows that both 
CH_GROWTH and CH_PER_CAPITA are significantly correlated with CH_PERCENT at the 1 
and the 5 percent level. The correlation between AVG_ELASTICITY and these three 
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moderator variables, which are directly attached to the measure (i.e. whether the change in 
output is measured at level or growth rate, in percent or percentage points, overall or per 
capita) is significant at the 10 percent level for CH_GROWTH and CH_PER_CAPITA, and at the 
5 percent level (close to the 1 percent level) for CH_PERCENT. Regression (2) (see table 3) 
shows, on the other hand, that none of the three variables have significant explanatory 
effect on AVG_ELASTICITY. Furthermore, the variance inflation factors range from 1.3 to 2.7, 
which indicates a moderate correlation. These contradictory results verify the 
multicollinearity problem. 
To reduce the distortionary effects of multicollinearity, we address the issue of having 
mapped a larger number of variables than the obtained sample size. Campos et al. (2005) 
emphasize general-to-specific modeling as a viable method for selecting useful empirical 
models. The general model is reduced by eliminating statistically insignificant variables while 
maintaining congruence. As some growth models (described in section 2, and employed in 
the studies reviewed in section 3) have similar or overlapping specifications, we may assume 
that the properties of the most correlated moderator variables are interlinked with other 
moderator variables. In order to establish congruence initially we modify the regression 
model by substituting the four most correlated moderator variables with the four study 
parameters. A total of 16 control variables (k) are hence analyzed initially. The parameter 
variables are biased towards the mean by replacing missing values by mean values. Each 
parameter variable contains from two to eight missing values for different studies, which 
would result in 12 eliminated studies if not using the mean value or omitting the variables. 
The estimation bias is controlled for in 18 regressions with different setups, where the 
preliminary model parameter variable coefficients are compared with parameter variable 
coefficients estimated under alternative conditions. 
The tax reform scenarios differ in terms of tax progressivity. For simplicity, we assume that 
the obtained tax progressivity reflects the full potential of tax progressivity change. In some 
cases the flat tax is slightly progressive due to basic deductions (e.g. the Hall-Rabushka flat 
tax), i.e. tax progressivity is larger than 1. In other cases the tax reform studied is not aiming 
for a flat tax, it only implies a change in the progressivity of the tax structure. Hence the tax 
elasticity might be understated, rather than the opposite. 
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The effect on output relative to change in tax progressivity – tax elasticity – is shown in the 
dependent variable AVG_ELASTICITY. For all studies included in the meta-regression there is 
a negative correlation between tax progressivity and output, hence a stronger effect is 
indicated by increasing the negative tax elasticity. The studies in the regression are sorted by 
calibration benchmark year to be able to take into account differences in model calibrations 
as the modeled economies change. 
 
Table 2: Control Variables 
Moderator Variables 
CH_GROWTH = 1 if summary statistic is change in growth , = 0 if change in growth rate 
CH_PERCENT = 1 if summary statistic is change in percent, = 0 if change in percentage points 
CH_PER_CAPITA = 1 if summary statistic is change per capita, = 0 otherwise 
COUNTRY = 1 if study uses US data only, = 0 otherwise 
HETERO = 1 if study uses heterogeneous agents, = 0 otherwise 
PROP_TAX = 1 if study targets a strictly proportional tax structure, = 0 otherwise 
FLAT_TAX = 1 if study targets a proportional tax structure with basic deductions, = 0 otherwise 
OVERLAP_GEN = 1 if study uses an overlapping generations model, = 0 otherwise 
PRODUCTIVITY = 1 if study uses a productivity variable 
SKILL = 1 if study measures skilled/unskilled ratios, = 0 otherwise 
SOCIAL_SECURITY = 1 if study includes social security structure, = 0 otherwise 
POP_GROWTH = 1 if study allows for population growth, = 0 otherwise 
GOV_EXP = 1 if study includes government expenditure, = 0 otherwise 
INHERIT = 1 if study allows for inheritance between generations, = 0 otherwise 
RETIRE = 1 if study allows for retirement of labor, = 0 otherwise 
OPEN_ECON = 1 if study uses an open-economy model, = 0 otherwise 
 
Parameter Variables 
CAP_SHARE = Physical capital share 
CAP_DEP = Depreciation rate of physical capital 
TIME_DISC = Intergenerational discount factor 
INT_SUBST = Elasticity of intertemporal substitution 
 
 
Meta-Regression Analysis 
The general regression model (3) is then (table 3): 
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where                 is the average tax elasticity of study  ,     is the coefficient of the 
 th moderator or parameter variable, and    is the error term.  
The general regression model fits the data very well. There are however two indications that 
multicollinearity is still present. First, from the aforementioned Pearson correlation test, 
now nine moderator and parameter variables are significantly correlated with the 
dependent variable at 1, 5 or 10 percent level. Additionally three instances have correlation 
close to but above the 10 percent level. Second, the variance inflation factors are still rather 
high, ranging from 3.6 to 22.2. 
We then reduce the general regression model by omitting the insignificant variables 
PRODUCTIVITY and HETERO. This solves to a large extent both the previously mentioned 
problem and the multicollinearity issues.  
The final and our preferred meta-regression model (4) is hence of the form (table 3): 
               
                                               
                                               
                                       
                                                      
    
 
As shown in table 3, the variance inflation factors are now in the range from 2.6 to 10.7, still 
indicating a degree of multicollinearity, however, much more moderate than in the initial 
model. All variables are now significant, and the explanatory factor is still high. The model fit 
may however, as previously discussed, be biased due to the use of means for missing values. 
To control for estimation bias each parameter variable is controlled in a total of 12 
regressions. Missing values are used first to avoid bias, then maximum and minimum values 
are used to control for extremes. The sensitivity analysis shows that the estimated 
coefficients for CAP_SHARE, TIME_DISC and INT_SUBST hold relatively well. For CAP_DEP the 
test shows high volatility in the coefficient estimates. As the variable only has eleven 
observations, this is reasonable. The bias towards the mean for all parameter variables must 
however be accounted for when drawing any conclusions. 
SNF Working Paper No 12/11
18 
 
Table 3: Results of Meta-Regression 
Dependent: Yi  
Regression 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Intercept (  ) 0.099 -0.057 -1.090 -1.215 
 (0.29) (-0.70) (-5.97)** (-6.74)*** 
CH_GROWTH 0.259   0.023 0.286 0.310 
 (0.59) (0.20) (7.23)** (6.97)*** 
CH_PERCENT -0.073 -0.169 0.185 0.111 
 (-0.18) (-1.51) (3.42)* (2.49)* 
CH_PER_CAPITA 0.335   0.061 0.134 0.112 
 (1.20) (0.69) (4.76)** (3.51)** 
COUNTRY -0.163  0.350 0.266 
 (-0.75)  (4.74)** (4.21)** 
HETERO 0.126  -0.053  
 (0.46)  (-2.02)  
PROP_TAX -0.132  0.091 0.105 
 (-0.69)  (4.04)* (4.42)** 
FLAT_TAX -0.373    
 (-1.16)    
OVERLAP_GEN -0.097  0.137 0.082 
 (-0.38)  (3.67)* (2.71)* 
PRODUCTIVITY 0.046  0.009  
 (0.33)  (0.36)  
SKILL 0.134  0.245 0.240 
 (0.59)  (9.12)** (7.55)*** 
SOCIAL_SECURITY -0.020    
 (-0.07)    
POP_GROWTH -0.019  -0.171 -0.145 
 (-0.12)  (-6.63)** (-5.80)*** 
GOV_EXP -0.170  -0.394 -0.341 
 (-0.72)  (-7.76)** (-6.73)*** 
INHERIT 0.205    
 (1.01)    
RETIRE -0.018    
 (-0.06)    
OPEN_ECON -0.102  0.174 0.138 
 (-0.49) 
 
(5.53)** (4.37)** 
CAP_SHARE   -2.430 -2.230 
   (-8.46)** (-6.81)*** 
CAP_DEP_PH   -4.563 -6.224 
   (-2.78) (-3.60)** 
TIME_DISC   1.012 1.287 
   (4.63)** (6.15)*** 
INT_SUBST   0.787 0.712 
   (8.18)** (7.35)*** 
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R-Square (percent) 87.1 33.1 99.7 99.1 
F-statistic 0.85 2.48 42.76** 32.06*** 
 
Coefficients (t-statistic in parentheses) 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively 
Model Testing and Interpretation 
Comparing the standard errors of the residuals from the analysis of variance with the mean 
of AVG_ELASTICITY, it appears that the standard errors are relatively large (S = 0.031 versus 
μ = -0.141). On the other hand, both unadjusted and adjusted coefficients of determination 
are high, indicating a good model fit. An F-test can demonstrate whether the null hypothesis 
may be rejected. At the 5 percent level the rejection region is                  . As the 
analysis of variance shows that         with a corresponding P-value of 0.002, there is 
strong evidence to infer that the model is valid. The multicollinearity problem can however 
still be present. The residual plots show that the required conditions are met to a reasonable 
extent, since the residuals are approximately normally distributed and have a constant 
variance. However they can be somewhat autocorrelated, given that there is inconsistency 
in the plot order. Another test for autocorrelation is the Durbin-Watson test. The critical 
values for             are          and          (see table 3 in Savin and White, 1977). 
Testing the Durbin-Watson statistic (1.586) for positive and negative autocorrelation, the 
test is inconclusive. A Pearson test shows no evidence of correlation between average 
benchmark year and AVG_ELASTICITY. Summing up, from the above it then appears that the 
model’s fit is good12. 
For the coefficients, the corresponding P-values denote whether the null hypothesis is true 
(high P-value) or not. The latter case is denoted in the regression table with the significance 
level of the t-statistics. At the 10 percent level all variables are significantly different from 0. 
The intercept is -1.215 and represents the predicted tax elasticity when all moderator and 
parameter variables are 0. Hence the size and negativity of the intercept is not to be strictly 
interpreted, however it fits well with the direction given by the studies in the meta-
regression. The measure moderator variable coefficients have the expected sign, except for 
                                                          
12
 It is worth mentioning that the final regression model shows a slightly less good fit than the initial model, 
even though the variance inflation factor is reduced by more than half. This indicates that the final model is 
more robust against interdependence between variables without losing explanatory value. 
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CH_PERCENT and COUNTRY. The decreasing effect of using percent as opposed to 
percentage points is surprising, as the data clearly show that the tax elasticity in studies 
using percentage points is overall much lower than in the studies using percent. The 
coefficient may be biased however due to multicollinearity as its variance inflation factor is 
8.7. Using US data only reduces the predicted elasticity by 0.266, however due to the low 
number of non-US studies in the regression, the result is not robust. If the overlapping 
generations model was used instead, the predicted tax elasticity is reduced by 0.082. When 
the study includes population growth and government expenditure, the predicted tax 
elasticity increases by -0.145 and -0.349. In turn, differences in skills and an open economy 
reduce the elasticity by 0.240 and 0.138. This illustrates that more complex economic 
models do not necessarily alter the conclusions. The effects gained through some of the 
elements included may be eliminated by the losses from other elements. For the 
parameters, the regression predicts that studies using high physical capital share and capital 
depreciation rate, and low intergenerational discount factor and elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution, will estimate high tax elasticity13. 
The consistently good fit of the meta-regression analyses illustrates that the calibration 
model specification and parameterization have a significant effect on outcomes. This implies 
that depending on the model structure, and consequently parameterization, the growth 
effects from reducing tax progressivity range from 0 percent (Stokey and Rebelo, 1995) to 
17.88 percent (Ventura, 1996). The benchmark data set is of less importance in terms of 
time. As tax policies in fact evolve over time in what respects tax progressivity, this indicates 
a model specification problem. See figure 2 for an illustration of tax progressivity in the US 
for the period covered by the studies. Intuitively, the effects of introducing a flat tax should 
be declining until 1988, increasing between 1988 – 1993, and then be stable until 2006, 
except for the lag between 2000 and 2002. For the studies no such conclusions can be 
drawn.  Comparing with the run chart in figure 3 there is a trend to broaden the model 
specification. This suggests that the earlier studies were more strict and static than the more 
recent ones, ignoring important effects of reducing tax progressivity. 
 
                                                          
13
 The model also indicates that including heterogeneous agents will yield higher elasticity, whereas a 
productivity variable will have modest effects. 
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Figure 2: US Individual Income Tax 1968 – 2006 
 
Source: Internal Revenue Services (IRS): SOI Tax Stats - Historical Table 23: U.S. Individual Income Tax: Personal Exemptions 
and Lowest and Highest Bracket Tax Rates, and Tax Base for Regular Tax (1913 - 2006). 
 
Figure 3: Run Chart of Moderator Variables, US articles 
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The model specification and parameterization bias may be reduced using the sufficient 
statistics methodology as put forward by Chetty (2008) as a way of bridging structural and 
reduced-form methodologies. As already mentioned, more complex models do not 
necessarily yield any differences in outcome.  The notion of constructing models which are 
transparent and credible and at the same time useful for aggregate predictions is interesting. 
Also the use of econometrically derived sufficient statistics for calibration models will 
improve the prediction quality. 
We conclude the meta-regression analysis by introducing a control of whether the final 
regression model yields a range similar to the growth effects from reducing tax progressivity 
in the calibration and econometric studies. The average elasticity for each study is predicted 
using the regression model (4) in table 3. Means are used for missing values. There is 
reasonable fit between predicted and average tax elasticity, where the predicted mean tax 
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elasticity is -0.141 with boundaries -0.220 and -0.063 (95 percent confidence interval). This 
equals the mean of the average tax elasticity, but the boundaries are slightly wider (upper 
bound of average tax elasticity is -0.211, lower bound is -0.072). In order to derive efficiency 
gains from tax elasticity and changes in tax progressivity, equation (1) is then reduced to: 
         
(4) 
The mean reduction in tax progressivity in the studies used in the meta-regression is 0.48. 
This implies that the average increase in the long run growth is 6.75 percent for the studies 
analyzed, with upper and lower boundaries at 10.06 and 3.44 percent, respectively. The 
prediction is equivalent to the range found in econometric studies, with boundaries at 10.51 
and 2.99 percent. 
5. INTRODUCTION OF FLAT TAX REFORM IN THE OECD COUNTRIES 
The marginal income tax rates and the corresponding tax progressivity for the OECD 
countries in 2007 are listed in table 4. As before, the personal allowance implies a lower 
marginal tax rate of zero. The total tax burden for persons and businesses is shown in figure 
4, further comprising business taxes, value added taxes, and duties; including these would 
drive up the effective marginal tax rates extensively. For example, according to the OECD 
Economic Survey of Sweden for 2007, combining “social contributions, income and 
consumption taxes drives the effective marginal tax rate above 70 percent for over a third of 
the full-time employed, helping to explain why working hours for those employed are below 
the OECD average” (OECD, 2007). For comparison, the top marginal income tax rate is 56.5 
percent according to the OECD Tax Database. As the effective marginal tax rates are not 
readily observable (Padovano and Galli, 2001) these are not included in this analysis. 
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Table 4: Taxation of Wage Income in the OECD Countries (2007) 
Country  
Personal allowance / 
Tax credit* 
Marginal rate* 
Top marginal rates (all-
in)** 
Tax progressivity 
Australia  0.0 % 46.5 % 1.87 
Austria  0.0 % 42.7 % 1.75 
Belgium 6,040 25.0 % 59.3 % 2.46 
Canada 1,440 15.0 % 46.4 % 1.87 
Czech Republic 7,200 12.0 % 40.5 % 1.68 
Denmark 39,500 5.5 % 63.0 % 2.70 
Finland  0.0 % 56.1 % 2.28 
France  0.0 % 49.8 % 1.99 
Germany  0.0 % 47.5 % 1.90 
Greece 12,000 29.0 % 49.6 % 1.98 
Hungary  18.0 % 71.0 % 2.83 
Iceland*** 385,800 22.8 % 34.3 % 1.52 
Ireland 1,760 20.0 % 47.0 % 1.89 
Italy 18,400 23.0 % 50.7 % 2.03 
Japan 3,800,000 5.0 % 47.8 % 1.92 
Korea 1,000,000 8.0 % 38.3 % 1.62 
Luxembourg  0.0 % 48.3 % 1.93 
Mexico 7,083.84 3.0 % 22.6 % 1.29 
Netherlands 2,043 2.5 % 52.0 % 2.08 
New Zealand  15.0 % 39.0 % 1.39 
Norway 100,800 12.6 % 47.8 % 1.92 
Poland 572.54 19.0 % 42.7 % 1.74 
Portugal 221.65 10.5 % 48.4 % 1.94 
Slovak Republic*** 95,616 19.0 % 27.8 % 1.39 
Spain 5,050 15.7 % 43.0 % 1.75 
Sweden 11,900 0.0 % 56.5 % 2.30 
Switzerland  0.0 % 47.9 % 1.92 
Turkey  15.0 % 35.6 % 1.32 
United Kingdom 5,225 10.0 % 41.0 % 1.69 
United States 8,750 10.0 % 42.7 % 1.75 
Source: OECD Tax Database, Taxation of Wage Income Part I (2007) Tax progressivity authors’ own calculations. 
*) Table I.5. Central government personal income tax rates and thresholds. Personal allowance/ tax credit in local currency. 
**) Table I.4. Top marginal personal income tax rates for employee 
***) Flat tax scheme 
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Figure 4: Total Tax Revenue as Percentage of GDP, 2006 
 
Source: OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, Revenue Statistics 1965-2007, 2008 Edition, Chart A. 
OECD – Total is authors’ own estimate (unweighted average) based on data from OECD.Stat. 
 
Bottom marginal tax rates are zero for all countries14 except Hungary and New Zealand. Note 
that non-tax revenues – such as court fees, driving license fees, harbor fees, passport fees, 
and radio and television license fees where public authorities provide the service – are not 
included in the figures. 
                                                          
14
 Zero tax rate, or equivalent deduction, according to OECD.Stat National Accounts. 
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Effects of Flat Tax Reforms on Economic Growth in the OECD Countries 
All studies used in the meta-regression analysis in section 4 are related to a single OECD 
country. In turn, the econometric studies mentioned previously, concern one or several 
OECD countries. Comparing the results from the final regression model with estimations for 
the OECD countries will hence yield relevant estimates, even if not directly transposable. 
These estimations are then based on the relation between tax elasticity, tax progressivity, 
and economic growth, which the meta-regression analysis finds to be robust. As most of 
these studies consider long run growth effects this is also the emphasis in the following. The 
studies yielding efficiency gains as an increase in the growth rate are however consistent 
with the remaining ones and the effects on economic growth would be even larger if using 
this approach in a long-run analysis. 
The estimations on economic growth could for simplicity be based on the assumption that all 
OECD countries have similar average tax elasticity. When considering the wide range of tax 
burdens in the OECD countries, as shown in figure 4, this is however a too restrictive 
measure which would yield overestimated growth effects. On the contrary, the tax burden 
might be partially interpreted as the realization of tax elasticity – higher tax elasticity will 
yield a downward pressure on governments’ fiscal policies and a lower tax burden; whereas 
lower tax elasticity implies less restraint on the government from the society. This relation 
may also be interpreted by a Laffer curve (Blinder, 1981; Mankiw, 1998; Laffer, 2004; Miles 
and Scott, 2005).  
The inverse U-shaped curve illustrates that increasing tax rates up to a certain point yields 
increased government revenue; beyond this tax revenue will decrease due to disincentive 
effects, i.e. reduced input and increased effort in tax avoidance. Tax elasticity defines the 
curve’s path (steepness and maximum), effective marginal tax rates define the current 
position at the curve, the sum being the tax burden. Modeling and measuring this 
relationship are outside the scope of this paper, hence the more simple linear relationship 
between tax burden and tax elasticity is assumed15. Still, increased tax revenue may be 
expected, as a simplified and less intrusive tax scheme provides less incentive for evasion 
                                                          
15 
Trabandt and Uhlig (2007) find that EU-15 is moving closer to the peak of the Laffer curve, yet is still at the 
left side of the curve. The US is also at the left side of the curve. Hence the approximation seems viable for 
most OECD countries. 
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and avoidance (Hall and Rabushka, 1995). Schneider (2005) estimates the average shadow 
economy for 21 OECD countries to 16.3 percent. 
Although the three non-US studies show an elasticity well below the mean of the US studies 
(-0.158), they are within the similar range (-0.503 to -0.003). A regression using the mean 
elasticity for the US, and the elasticity for Sweden, Spain and Denmark, and the respective 
tax burdens in figure 4 indicates however that using the tax burden as proxy for tax elasticity 
is a reasonable approximation. This is also confirmed by a Pearson correlation test showing a 
correlation of 0.941 with a corresponding P-value of 0.059. The results are shown in table 5. 
Comparing the elasticity predictions using the regression equation for the US, Spain, Sweden 
and Denmark with the average tax elasticity shows only small deviations. 
Table 5: Approximated Tax Elasticities for the OECD Countries 
Country Tax versus GDP Ratio Estimated elasticity Approximated elasticity 
Australia 30,60  -0,130 
Austria 41,74  -0,074 
Belgium 44,52  -0,060 
Canada 33,33  -0,116 
Czech Republic 36,92  -0,098 
Denmark 49,14 -0,049 -0,037 
Finland 43,47  -0,065 
France 44,17  -0,062 
Germany 35,58  -0,105 
Greece 31,32  -0,126 
Hungary 37,08  -0,097 
Iceland 41,52  -0,075 
Ireland 31,88  -0,123 
Italy 42,15  -0,072 
Japan 27,90  -0,143 
Korea 26,77  -0,149 
Luxembourg 35,90  -0,103 
Mexico 20,57  -0,180 
Netherlands 39,32  -0,086 
New Zealand 36,71  -0,099 
Norway 43,94  -0,063 
Poland 33,51  -0,115 
Portugal 35,70  -0,104 
Slovak Republic 29,77  -0,134 
Spain 36,64 -0,074 -0,099 
Sweden 49,08 -0,035 -0,037 
Switzerland 29,61  -0,135 
Turkey 24,52  -0,160 
United Kingdom 37,12  -0,097 
United States 
OECD - Total 
28,00 
35,95 
-0,158 
 
-0,143 
-0,103 
 
Source: Tax versus GDP ratio is from OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, Revenue Statistics 1965-2007, 2008 
Edition, table 1. Elasticities are based on author’s own calculations. 
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The changes in the tax progressivity are assumed to yield 1, i.e.: a pure flat tax with no 
deductions. This extreme scenario is chosen to show the inherent potential of proportional 
taxes, although the Hall-Rabushka flat tax and most other suggested and implemented flat 
tax schemes also include fixed deductions which imply progressivity in the tax scheme. Using 
the purely flat tax also avoids entering into an extensive analysis of tax rates and deduction 
levels, which are likely to be different for each country since the current tax levels differ 
substantially (see table 4). 
Comparing the average tax elasticity and the tax progressivity reduction shows that the 
change in tax progressivity has a larger share of the efficiency gain than do changes in tax 
rate. This is a supporting evidence for the flat tax scheme in that progressive tax structures 
have more adverse effects on output than do high tax rates. Like most studies concerning 
the US, which has relatively low tax progressivity compared to other OECD countries, the 
overall increase is expected to be somewhat larger. 
Tax progressivity for each OECD country is seen from table 4. The reductions in tax 
progressivity range from 0.29 to 2.45. By utilizing equation (4) the efficiency gains for the 
OECD countries are estimated based on the approximated tax elasticity and tax progressivity 
calculations. The potential effect on economic growth from shifting to a strictly proportional 
tax scheme ranges from 3.9 percent (New Zealand and Iceland) to a magnitude of 17.8 
percent (Hungary). The unweighted average for the OECD countries is 9.16 percent. Figure 5 
shows the individual estimations. These are then compared with other studies in order to 
control for the validity of the estimates. 
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Figure 5: Growth Potential from Flat Tax Reforms for the OECD Countries in 2007 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. Data derived from OECD.Stat and SourceOECD. 
The estimated results for nine of the OECD countries are compared with findings in other 
studies. The comparison generally provides support for the estimations, as most studies find 
similar results. 
- Canada (10.06 percent): Similar to the efficiency costs of the current tax scheme, which 
Diewert (1988) finds to range from 10 to 20 percent. The estimation is higher than the 
efficiency gains referred to by Clemens et al. (2001) and Emes et al. (2001) – 2 – 4 
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percent by capital formation, 3 percent by work incentives. In Fraser Forum (February 
2008) Alvin Rabushka and Niels Veldhuis also assume a 6 percent increase in output. 
- Denmark (6.23 percent): Slightly higher than the estimate of 5.4 percent in Jensen, 
Nielsen, Pedersen and Sorensen (1994). 
- Italy (7.38 percent): Comparable to Colombino and del Boca (1990) who estimate 43.75 
percent less inefficiency in the purely flat tax scheme. 
- Norway (5.75 percent): Exceeds the estimations in Stølen et al. (1999), where output 
effects range from -0.65 percent to 0.63 percent by a revenue neutral tax reform (tax 
progressivity is reduced by half of the present reduction). The predicted efficiency gain is 
however compared to the efficiency cost of 34.2 percent on welfare estimated in 
Aaberge et al. (2000). 
- Slovak Republic (5.16 percent): Relatively high, considering that the country already has 
a flat tax of 19 percent with a basic deduction. The growth potential hence indicates that 
even with a flat tax scheme the overall tax burden is still high, and hence illustrates the 
effect of reducing tax rates even further and removing the basic deduction. Krajčír and 
Ódor (2005) simulate between 0.2 and 0.5 percent annual growth in GDP from the 
present flat tax reform. 
- Spain (7.50 percent): less than the 12.6 percent efficiency gain found by González-
Torrabadella and Pijoan-Mas (2006), this is partially due to the difference in initial tax 
progressivity (they use 1999 as base year, whereas this paper uses 2007 as base year).  
- Sweden (4.80 percent): Lower than the 7.6 percent efficiency gain that Elger and 
Lindqvist (2007) find when analyzing a pure flat tax scheme. 
- United Kingdom (6.74 percent): Similar to the estimations in Heath (2006).  
- United States (10.66 percent): Close to what Altig et al. (2001) find to be the effects of 
shifting to a proportional consumption tax. Congressional Budget Office, US Congress 
(1997) also refers to general equilibrium and structural macroeconomic models which 
yield increases in long run growth by 1 to 10 percent. Romer and Romer (2007) find even 
larger effects in their analysis of tax changes, in that increasing taxes by 1 percent of GDP 
reduces GDP by 3 percent. The estimation is however larger than the simulation result of 
5.2 percent by Allen Sinai referred to in Thorning (2002). This simulation is based on a 
flat tax introduced in 1991, and the GDP increase is simulated in 2004. There is however 
an upward trend, which might imply an even level of GDP in the long run. Thorning 
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(2002) also presents results from nine other studies on flat tax reforms, these range from 
-4.2 to 16.9 percent output growth. 
The overall long run growth potential for the OECD countries fits well within the range of the 
calibration studies used in the meta-regression analysis. The increased growth effect (from 
6.75 based on the meta-regression to 9.16 percent) is partially due to the reduction in tax 
progressivity (0.89) being almost twice of the average reduction in (0.48). Compared with 
the econometric studies the estimate is similar to the growth effects of the effective 
marginal tax rates which Padovano and Galli (2001) estimate to be 1.1 – 1.2 percentage 
points on growth rate. The estimation shows a larger effect than what Koester and Kormendi 
(1987), and Lee and Gordon (2005) find, however they do not consider any change in tax 
progressivity.  
To illustrate the potential growth path of economic output in a scenario where all OECD 
countries introduce flat tax reforms, the estimated long run output growth of 9.16 percent 
for all OECD countries is added to actual GDP for the period 1997 - 2007. The probable effect 
of flat tax reforms on economic output for the OECD countries is shown in figure 6. 
Figure 6: Growth Potential from Flat Tax Reforms for the OECD Countries 1997 – 2007 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. Data derived from OECD.Stat and SourceOECD. 
Engen and Skinner (1996) note that even modest growth effects have large long run effects. 
To illustrate this, figure 6 also shows the accumulated foregone output for the period 1997 
to 2007. 
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The flat tax rates necessary for revenue neutral tax reforms estimated in the calibration 
studies range from 17 to 35 percent, hence the estimated growth effects imply that the flat 
tax rate needs to be within these boundaries. This simplification restricts the possibility for 
inferring on the tax rates necessary for revenue neutral reforms. Intuitively, the effects on 
economic output will be larger than predicted if the flat tax rate is set lower than 17 percent, 
and smaller if the flat tax rate is set higher than 35 percent. See González-Torrabadella and 
Pijoan-Mas (2006), and Elger and Lindqvist (2007) for quantitative studies of the diminishing 
effects on output as the progressivity of flat tax schemes increases. 
Reducing tax progressivity to 1 shows the largest possible effect on output. This is not a 
feasible flat tax scheme for most OECD countries. The Hall-Rabushka flat tax with basic 
deductions will, on the other hand, provide a sound and middle-ground tax scheme where 
the considerations of the less wealthy are taken care of. The tax rates and deduction levels 
are likely to differ as they are associated with the tax level in each country. Determining the 
necessary tax rates and the corresponding deduction levels for the flat tax schemes to be 
revenue neutral is not analyzed in this paper. However, as González-Torrabadella and Pijoan-
Mas (2006) point out, setting the tax rate and corresponding deduction level too high will 
have adverse effects on economic growth. For some high-tax countries the conclusion may 
hence be that the fundamental flat tax reform is not feasible unless accompanied by a 
fundamental reform of government expenditure. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
The estimated growth for the OECD countries is based on the tax elasticity and tax 
progressivity. The tax elasticity is based on estimated growth effects relative to changes in 
tax progressivity. Hence an estimation bias might be present. To control for this the 
dependent variable is tested for the meta-regression variation and the estimation variation, 
based on the 95 percent confidence interval for the estimates from the meta-regression 
analysis and for the OECD countries, respectively. The moderator and parameter variables 
are tested for meta-regression variation, based on ± 1 standard error of coefficients from 
regression (4). The results are shown in tables 6 and 7. 
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Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis Dependent Variable 
Dependent:         (percent) 
 
Yi 
                    ΔѲ 
High 
MRA (0.67)                     OECD (1.02) 
Low 
MRA (0.29)      OECD (0.76) 
High 
        MRA (-0.211) 
        OECD (-0.116) 
Low 
        MRA (-0.072) 
        OECD (-0.090) 
 
 
14.02 
 
 
4.80 
 
 
 
11.80 
 
 
9.19 
 
6.10 
 
 
2.09 
 
 
8.80 
 
 
6.85 
MRA – Estimate from meta-regression analysis 
OECD – Estimate for OECD countries 
 
Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis Moderator and Parameter Variables 
Dependent:         (percent) 
 
                  
High                           Low 
Moderator Variables 
CH_GROWTH 
CH_PERCENT 
CH_PER_CAPITA 
COUNTRY 
PROP_TAX 
OVERLAP_GEN 
SKILL 
POP_GROWTH 
GOV_EXP 
OPEN_ECON 
Parameter Variables 
CAP_SHARE 
CAP_DEP 
TIME_DISC 
INT_SUBST 
 
 
8.43 
8.22 
7.07 
9.29 
7.46 
7.51 
7.39 
7.19 
8.66 
7.23 
 
11.44 
11.79 
16.39 
9.24 
 
 
5.08 
5.29 
6.43 
4.21 
6.04 
5.99 
6.11 
6.31 
4.84 
6.28 
 
2.06 
1.72 
-2.89 
4.27 
 
For the dependent variable the estimations used in the meta-regression analysis vary more 
than the estimations for the OECD countries. The wider range is reasonable as the estimates 
are based on the meta-regression elasticity ranging from -0.503 to -0.003, compared with 
the approximated elasticity for the OECD countries ranging from -0.180 to -0.037. The 
boundaries range from 14.02 to 2.09 percent in the meta-regression case. All control 
variables yield a similar range, indicating that the result from the regression model is robust. 
The moderator variables range from 9.29 to 4.21 percent, the narrower range confirms that 
the tax elasticity has a smaller share of efficiency gain than do changes in tax progressivity. 
As previously discussed, the parameter variables are less robust; here the widest range is in 
the case of TIME_DISC, which ranges from 16.39 to -2.89. This confirms that parameter 
variables should be estimated carefully and with high precision, as even minor deviations 
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may alter the result substantially. The control of coefficients in figure 7 and table 8 serves as 
a complimentary robustness check for the parameter variables. For the dependent variable 
in the estimates for the OECD countries the upper and lower boundaries are 11.08 and 6.85 
percent, respectively. 
Figure 7: Estimated Parameter Variable Coefficients Deviation from Benchmark Coefficient 
 
The sensitivity analysis shows that the estimated effects on economic growth from 
introducing a flat tax reform in the OECD countries are robust, as TIME_DISC (low case) is the 
only incidence where the estimated growth is negative. The high case is, however, at the 
other extreme. The remaining 13 control variables yield consistent positive growth effects. 
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Table 8: Control of Estimated Parameter Variable Coefficients 
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2 CONCLUSION 
This paper explores the effects of flat tax reforms on economic growth in the OECD 
countries, focusing on the period from 1997 to 2007. A meta-regression analysis on 18 tax 
reform calibration studies, of which 15 concern the US, summarizes the average growth 
potential to 6.75 percent. Extending the findings in the meta-regression analysis to current 
tax progressivity and economic growth, the most probable growth effects for the OECD 
countries are estimated. The 2006/2007 level of tax progressivity and elasticity is estimated 
to yield a growth potential of 9.16 percent in real output for the OECD area. Controlling for 
estimation bias in parameter coefficients and prediction model, the conclusions remain 
robust. A recent OECD study (Arnold, 2008) confirms to a large extent our findings on the 
relation between taxation and economic growth. 
The large Keynesian countercyclical fiscal policies currently implemented by most OECD 
countries are mostly short or medium term solutions. These measures may be 
complemented by the long run solutions provided by flat tax schemes. The flat tax era is still 
at its infancy, but the opportunities for change have improved. We have shown that flat tax 
reforms might reduce the length and depth of the current worldwide economic downturn, 
to speed up recovery and improve future growth and prosperity. 
Two extensions of interest appear which are related to the measuring of the necessary flat 
tax rates and corresponding deduction levels for the OECD countries in a Hall-Rabushka flat 
tax scenario. First, a measure including only income and business tax is of interest. This may 
be the most feasible reform today due to constraints in partisan politics. Second, a measure 
which also includes the removal of value-added taxes, hence completely extinguishing 
double taxation as intended by Hall and Rabushka (1995). 
The meta-regression analysis might be further developed to include the endogenous labor 
supply elasticities as pointed out by Stokey and Rebelo (1995). For this paper the exogenous 
parameterization is a reasonable measurement of the parameters’ effects on output 
estimates. The meta-regression analysis is limited to flat tax studies using calibration 
methodology. A similar analysis with studies using panel data or cross-section 
methodologies (e.g. Vedder, 1985; Koester and Kormendi, 1987; Colombino and del Boca, 
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1990; Padovano and Galli, 2001; Lee and Gordon, 2005) can provide additional insights into 
results of existing research, and set direction for future framework and modeling efforts. 
The tax elasticities in the predictions are average for each country; an extension of the 
model might be to estimate tax elasticities for different income groups for each country. A 
comparable measure is the elasticity of taxable income, which Gruber and Saez (2000) find 
to differ as much as the tax elasticities differ between the countries. This will also affect the 
growth effect of a flat tax reform. 
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